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Abstract 
 
Calendar anomalies such as January and weekend effects were found to exist in many 
international stock markets. Explanations of these anomalies are vast and so far are not robust. 
This paper examines these anomalies in a distinct emerging market, Kuwait stock market (KSE). 
With Kuwait joining the World Trade Organization treaty (WTO) and by opening its stock market 
to foreign investors, it becomes important to investigate stock behavior in KSE. The study finds 
interesting regularities in trading patterns of investors related to the weekend as well as to the day 
of the week. That is, there exists a weekend effect and is robust to the methodology applied. 
However, this effect is different from that uncovered in other developed stock markets in the sense 
that the first trading day (Saturday in KSE) shows positive returns and the second trading day 
(Sunday in KSE) shows negative returns. Other days show no systematic behavior and if detected, 
it is insignificant. On the other hand, January effect is not detected in KSE and returns in January 
are mot different from those in other months. However, returns during summer months (May-
September) tend to be significantly higher than returns during other months of the year (October-
April) in what is termed as summer effect. The most plausible elucidation relates to human factors 
as investors in KSE sense no unhealthy information about firms over the weekend and hence make 
their portfolio acquisition decisions in Saturdays and reverse these decisions on next day to 
capitalize on their marginal profits. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
nomalous regularities in security returns have been analyzed for a long time as they represent a great 
challenge for the equilibrium theories of asset returns. Besides anomalies that are related to firm 
characteristics such as the size anomaly of Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981), there is a body of 
literature that tackles peculiar patterns labeled as calendar (or seasonal) anomalies as rates of returns behave 
differently and consistently in certain times of the year. From these is the weekend effect where stock returns are 
found to be significantly negative in the first trading day (Monday) as documented by Cross (1973), French (1980), 
Gibbons and Hess (1981), Keim and Stambaugh (1984), Ball and Bowers (1986), to name a few. In addition to 
Monday effect, there is also the January effect. Rozeff and Kinney (1976), Tinic and West (1984), Gultekin and 
Gultekin (1983), among others, all show that expected returns and risk show consistent and reliable relation in 
January while the exclusion of January returns would result in almost zero risk premium. As in the US, the positive 
returns in January have also been found in many international stock markets. All these anomalies are considered, by 
many, as evidence against market efficiency. In spite of the documented literature of the calendar anomalies, the 
more recent findings interrogate with the previous results, at least in the recent periods. For example, the previously 
documented predictability of returns was shown to be declining (Lo et al 1997). Agrawal and Tandom (1994) survey 
many countries and find that Monday effect is absent in the eighties. 
 
 Although the anomalies evidence has been well documented for almost all developed stock markets (Jaffe 
and Westerfield 1989; Agrawal and Tandom 1994), the evidence of anomalies in developing and emerging stock 
markets is almost rare and ambiguous. As these markets are developing, they are structurally different from 
developed stock markets. That is, these markets, as they are developing, have different institutional differences 
relative to the more developed stock markets. For example, while Branch (1977) and Brauer and Chang (1990) , 
among others, bring the tax loss transactions as a valid explanation for the January effect, that elucidation can not be 
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applied to all market settings since  many markets function in a free-tax economy
1
. In addition to the investment tax 
structure, other elements include the information-based feature (which mitigates the efficiency of these markets), the 
institutional infrastructure (markets entry and exit regulations), lack of liquidity and depth, the accounting and legal 
systems, and the market microstructure elements. This might have its effect on the nature of the seasonal anomalies 
and hence differences in the mode of the anomalies might arise Based upon that, this study should add to the 
literature by its possible unique findings regarding either supporting or rejecting both the Monday and the January 
effects in a unique market setting where the week starts in Saturday and ends in Wednesday and all firms pay no 
taxes. This the first study for calendar anomalies in KSE which employs clean and reliable data that start from the 
inception of the KSE in 1984. Therefore, it tends to be more exploratory in nature than analytically with respect to 
anomaly rational. 
 
Kuwait Stock Market (KSE) 
 
The properties of Kuwait stock market has been analyzed recently and compared to other international 
stock markets by many researchers. For example, Butler et al (Journal of Banking and Finance, 1992), examined the 
efficiency of KSE and document a competitive auction stock exchange system. Al-loughani (1995) also finds that 
the behavior of the stock returns in KSE, like that in US, is not random walk. 
 
Like most other markets, KSE has gone through many statutory and institutional changes which matched 
the common "boom-bust” scenarios that occur to any stock market. Three stages have characterized the history of 
stock trading in Kuwait and each stage usually ends with a crash. The establishment of the official KSE in 1984 after 
the crash of Almanak (over-the-counter market) has set a new era for stock trading in Kuwait as many regulations 
were instituted to organize trading. In general, one can fairly say that key traders and insiders have dominated stock 
trades especially before 1990, when the KSE closed for about two years due to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. In 
addition, throughout its history, KSE has been characterized by irregularity in trades and price formation process. 
Many ambition efforts by the economic administration of the country are being reflected in clear steps to improve 
the economy and the investment environment, which eventually should positively influence the efficiency of KSE. 
For example, recently, Kuwaiti parliament approved a code that permits foreign investors to trade in KSE. This 
should have its effect on stabilizing the market and enlarge the investors' base
2
. One impediment to improving 
efficiency of KSE is the regulatory structure of the market. Unlike most developed markets, KSE is supervised by, 
besides its administration, two ministries (Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Commerce) and the central bank. It 
has been argued by many investors that these regulatory organizations cause trading noise
3
 by their occasional 
conflicting commandments, which causes confusion to investors. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
 While calendar anomalies have been analyzed in many developed big markets, smaller emerging markets 
have not yet been analyzed enough. These markets have definitely different settlement procedures, especially delays 
between trading and settlement. Many standard models in modern finance are ill suited and can not be used (as they 
are) to deal with the specific circumstances arising continuously in the emerging markets. Hence, trading in 
emerging markets (such as KSE) provides a vehicle by which many finance models can be modified to 
accommodate the structure of (and even to develop new models to suit) these markets (Bekaert and Harvey, 2003).  
 
 KSE represents a unique market setting in which many internationally-observed calendar anomalies might 
have different form. First, up to the moments of writing this study, derivative securities are not allowed in KSE and 
no bond market is actively established. Second, the only traded security is the common stock and no issuance of 
preferred stocks. Third, a new forward contract has been instituted since February 1998 but trading is valid only for 
10 financial firms. In addition, it is not similar to the forward contract available for investors in other markets. 
Fourth, trading of many firms in the index is nonsynchronous and all firms don't pay taxes. Furthermore, 
fluctuations in prices seem to be affected by sociopolitical factors. Fifth, as mentioned earlier, and unlike other 
developed markets, KSE is controlled by three entities besides its administration. Further, firms’ annual statements 
usually delayed for months after the end of the fiscal year given the laxity of regulations that govern trading rules
4
 
and even though, all these financial statements are barely informative enough which yields huge noise in trading. 
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Sixth, insiders can trade on the special information they posses without any regulation against this investment 
behavior. All these differences between KSE (as an emerging market) and most stock markets in the world are 
expected to wield its effects on the elsewhere-observed relationships.  Based upon these differences, different form 
of return seasonal might be detected in KSE. Specifically, the following hypotheses are to be investigated 
 
(H1): Returns in Saturday are negative (the weekend effect). 
 
(H2): Returns in January are, on average, positive (January effect). 
 
(H3): Returns during summer time (May-September) are lower than those during other times of the year (October-
April) (“sell in May and go a way” or Halloween Indicator) 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
 This study uses daily closing index values that span the period 1-Feb-1984 to 31-Dec-2000, with total 
sample daily observations of 3663. The index used is constructed by the Global Investment House (a prestigious 
investment firm in Kuwait) and is capitalization weighted index which avoids the bias introduced by value weighted 
indices. The index includes all firms traded in KSE. Unlike western markets, KSE opens Saturday to Wednesday 
from 9AM to 12:30PM and closes Thursdays and Fridays. Thursdays trading was abandoned on 1984 and the last 
trading Thursday was at 23-Aug-1984. Due to discontinuities and to preserve data stability, all Thursday 
observations (i.e. Thursday returns) during 1984 (only 24 obs) were excluded from the analysis but their values were 
used to calculate the returns of the following Saturdays. 
 
 To account for continuous parameterization, all returns are calculated by taking the log of the previous 
day's index value divided by today's index value. Table (1) contains summary statistics of the data for three types of 
indexes. “GI” refers to the general index; “LI” refers to the index of large firms; “SI” refers to the index of small-
size firms (the rational behind using three indices will be explained later on). Also, for the “GI” index, the data was 
portioned for two periods that represent the obligatory two-year-closure of the stock market due to the occupation of 
Kuwait by Iraq (a test will be carried out later on to show the statistical validity of this conjecture). As the table 
indicates, one can note that the mean return over the two distinct periods is different. Before the KSE closure, the 
mean return is negative as is the case when considering the mean return of the total period analyzed. After the KSE 
closure, however, the mean return tends to be positive. The same result is supported for the three indices analyzed. 
For the small index, however, the mean return is positive for both periods. On the other hand, for the week days, it is 
apparent that the mean return for Saturdays (1
st
 trading day of the week) is positive and this is true for the three 
indices used in this study. However, Sundays’ mean return is always negative and this is true with all indices. The 
higher returns of the small index is justified (principally) by the higher standard deviation. On a different note, 
return distributions are skewed to the left except when considering the small index while the excess kurtosis is 
highest for the large index. This finding conforms to the sparse evidence of the literature regarding stock returns’ 
distribution (see for example Black 1986). 
 
Following others (like Keim and Stambuagh 1984 ), this study tests for the weekend effect using the 
following model: 
 
Ri = f { D1, D2, D3, D4, D5; e } 
 
Where Ri denotes the daily continuous returns. D1-D5 are dummy variables that take the value of "1" for the 
respective day and "zero" otherwise where "D1" represents Saturdays, "D2" represents Sundays, etc.  The "e" is a 
well-behaved error term.  
 
The regression test is carried out for two distinct periods that are believed to have different results. As 
pointed out earlier, the separation point is the discontinuities of trading
5
 from 2
nd
 of Aug, 1990 till the reopening of 
the market at 27
th
 of Sept, 1992. Since there was interruption in trading (more than two years), the two periods might 
be distinct in terms of the parameters’ function; and if so, the results of the analysis would be misleading if all data 
is considered as one series. This conjecture is tested by employing Chow structural break test.  
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Furthermore, a mean test (as employed by most previous studies) will be carried out to test the significance of the 
weekend effect as well as the January effect. 
 
 In addition to that, there is a common belief that most people (including investors) travel in summer and 
accordingly cash their portfolios before summer time, hence, according to this view, month of May signals a start of 
a bear market. Because of this, very popular and old market wisdom (“sell in May and go a way”) has evolved in 
some western markets. In this attribute, the state of affairs in Kuwait is not different from that in other countries and 
it comes in a straight line with the stated conjecture as month of May usually signals a long summer break for people 
in Kuwait. This assumption is tested by employing a dummy-form regression model. 
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Continuous Returns 
 
 
Index  Time period Mean SD Skew Kurt 
       
GI  All Period -0.0001 0.0092 -0.2350 31.4903 
  Before KSE Closure -0.0006 0.0104 -0.7805 34.5069 
  After KSE Closure 0.0003 0.0081 0.7652 19.0111 
       
  Saturday 0.0012 0.0092 0.8916 7.9399 
 All Sunday -0.0007 0.0089 1.2849 26.6080 
 Period Monday -0.0006 0.0102 -4.1410 57.4989 
  Tuesday 0.0000 0.0088 1.0049 14.0314 
  Wednesday -0.0005 0.0085 2.0740 32.8352 
       
LI  All Period -0.0001 0.0125 -1.7072 49.3744 
  Before KSE Closure -0.0007 0.0155 -2.1252 44.6123 
  After KSE Closure 0.0004 0.0096 0.4594 14.7539 
       
  Saturday 0.0015 0.0121 0.1466 17.5920 
 All Sunday -0.0009 0.0126 -1.0472 26.2159 
 Period Monday -0.0010 0.0147 -6.3958 90.1963 
  Tuesday 0.0002 0.0112 1.1519 11.9976 
  Wednesday -0.0004 0.0116 2.4647 34.3278 
       
SI  All Period 0.0003 0.0099 0.7211 24.4445 
  Before KSE Closure 0.0001 0.0094 1.8066 43.1500 
  After KSE Closure 0.0005 0.0103 0.0662 14.1870 
       
  Saturday 0.0008 0.0114 1.0804 29.0546 
 All Sunday -0.0001 0.0096 0.1721 15.3109 
 Period Monday 0.0003 0.0089 0.1788 13.6627 
  Tuesday 0.0005 0.0101 1.3383 36.8057 
  Wednesday 0.0002 0.0093 0.2478 11.6091 
Notes 
 GI = General index: includes all traded stocks in Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) 
 LI = Large index: includes top 10 firms in terms of market value (monthly rebalancing) 
 SI = Small index: includes smallest 10 firms in terms of market value (monthly rebalancing) 
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 The detection of a calendar anomaly might be affected by the method used to construct the index and to 
some extent, may be affected by the size of firms. Also, there might be an influence on the results due to other 
phenomena such as nonsychronous trading (usually a trait of many stocks in emerging markets). Therefore, in order 
to test the sensitivity of results to these assumptions, and in order to test the consistency of the observed regularities, 
two portfolio indices are used. The first index represents the performance of the largest firms in KSE (top 10 firms 
in terms of market value) and the second index represents the performance of the smallest firms (lowest 10 firms in 
terms of market value) in KSE. The size indices (portfolios) are formed at the beginning of each month based on the 
firms’ market values and held for one month. In their study in 1976, Rozeff and Kinney provide intertemporal-
information explanation for the unusual large returns in January which results in positive price reactions to news in 
January. A complementary argument comes from Barry and Brown in 1985 as their models show higher systematic 
risk for relatively information-poor securities than that of information-rich securities. One way to test this conjecture 
is to assume that small-capitalization stocks are poor-information stocks while rich-information stocks are large-
capitalization stocks. Another reasoning comes from the fact that the large index used in this study represents the 
most actively-traded stocks which should mitigate problems associated with the nonsynchronous trading. 
Consequently, all tests in this study will be carried out by using the three indices. In addition to that, the weekend 
anomaly will be tested in several ways to check the robustness of the results.  
 
Results and Analysis 
 
Weekend Effect 
 
 Table (2) contains a mean test (used by many like French, 1980 and Gibbon and Hess, 1981) for the daily 
returns of the three indices employed in this study. The rational behind stratifying the daily returns into two distinct 
periods is the mandatory closure of KSE for more than two years. As panel (A) in table (1) shows, there seems to be 
a consistent weekend effect as the first trading day has significant positive returns for the three indices used. This 
contradicts the sparse evidence found in all previous studies that first trading day’s returns are, on average, 
significantly negative. Also, the second trading day (Sunday) seems to consistently show significant negative returns 
for both the large and the general indices but not for the small index. Other daily returns shows no consistency (i.e. 
third trading day, Monday, returns show negative trend but only when considering large index). 
 
Panels (B) and (C) in table (2) partition the study period into two sub-periods. Panel (B) shows the results of the 
mean test for the pre-closure period returns. One can observe that the positive returns in Saturday are insignificant in 
this period even when considering all the indices. However, the mean test shows that Sunday returns are still 
negative except when considering the small firm index. Monday also has negative returns except when considering 
the small firm index. Other days show also negative returns but these are insignificant. Panel (C) shows different 
pattern in the after-closure period as only Saturday returns are significantly positive for all indices. Although other 
days’ returns are negative, they are not different from zero.  
 
As far as the significant results in table (2) are concerned, it seems that large portfolio returns are higher in 
magnitude than those of the small portfolio. This is true for Saturday returns and for both “GI” and “LI” stocks. 
However, for Sunday returns, large portfolio returns seem to be more negative. 
 
The inconsistencies in mean tests over the different periods call for more robust analysis. Hence, a 
regression model is employed to test the weekend effect. Table (3) includes the results of that test. As it appears, 
results in table (3) confirm the existence of the weekend effect. However, this effect is different than what was 
established in all previous studies conducted in other international stock markets. While the first day of the week 
exhibits negative returns in all markets studied so far, astonishingly, the first day of the week in KSE exhibits 
positive returns. This finding is statistically significant and consistent over the three indices used in this study. In 
addition, the results show that returns of the second trading day (Sunday) are, on average, negative. This result holds 
true for the general index as well as for the large firms' index but not for the small firms' index. Monday returns are 
also negative but significant only when employing the large firms' index. All other daily returns are statistically 
insignificant and hence are not different from zero. One important feature of the regression results that is worth to 
mention is that Saturday returns are the highest while Sunday returns are the lowest. 
2, Number 1h                                                                               Volume Journal of Business & Economics Researc 
 42 
Table 2: Daily Mean Returns 
 
  Sat Sun Mon Tue Wed 
  Panel (A): All Period   
 GI .12 
(.0004) 
-.07 
(.0353) 
-.06 
(.1084) 
-.03 
(.9245) 
-.04 
(.1414) 
 LI .15 
(.0008) 
-.09 
(.0525) 
-.1 
(.0571) 
.02 
.(5792) 
-.04 
(.3971) 
 SI .08 
(.0531) 
-.01 
(.7781) 
.03 
(.2958) 
.05 
(.1569) 
.01 
(.6252) 
  Panel (B): Before Closure   
 GI .04 
(.537) 
-.13 
(.0132) 
-.13 
(.0647) 
-.02 
(.7024) 
-.04 
(.482) 
 LI 
 
.08 
(.3437) 
-.22 
(.0071) 
-.21 
(.0571) 
.03 
(.6552) 
-.04 
(.6078) 
 SI 
 
-.01 
(.819) 
-.01 
(.8958) 
-.01 
(.8845) 
.06 
(.2796) 
.03 
(.6142) 
  Panel (C): After Closure   
 GI 
 
.19 
(.0001) 
-.02 
(.5917) 
-.001 
(.8832) 
.02 
(.6143) 
-.05 
(.1217) 
 LI .21 
(.0001) 
.02 
(.7577) 
-.02 
(.6321) 
.01 
(.741) 
-.03 
(.4578) 
 SI .16 
(.0107) 
-.01 
(.7919) 
.07 
(.1702) 
.05 
(.3476) 
.01 
(.8345) 
Notes 
 Reported daily returns are in percentages  
 GI = General index that includes all stocks traded in KSE 
 LI = Large index that includes only large firms (monthly rebalancing) 
 SI = Small index that includes only small firms (monthly rebalancing) 
 Numbers in parentheses are probability values testing the hypothesis that mean  = zero 
 Before closure = Feb. 1st, 1984  to  Aug. 1st, 1990 
 After closure = Sept. 27th, 1992  to  Dec. 31st, 2000 
 
 
 In order to corroborate (and to check) the robustness of the results and due to the two-year obligatory 
closure of KSE, a structural break test has been conducted to test the 
stability of parameters for the three indices. The result of this test is contained in table (4) 
 
The probability values of the employed two test statistics confirm a structural break of the return series 
between the two periods, namely, before and after the obligatory closure of KSE and this is true for both the general 
and the large firm indices but not for the small firms' index.  
 
The structural break test result necessitates re-estimating the model of table (3) for two distinct sub-periods. 
Although the test results confirm the stability of the coefficients when employing small firms' index, the model will 
be re-estimated using the three indices for comparison purposes. The results are contained in table (5). 
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Table 3: Results of Regressing Daily Returns on Week Days 
 
Dep. Var GI LI SI 
Sat .0012 
(.0003) 
.0015 
(.0007) 
.0008 
(.0528) 
Sun -.0007 
(.035) 
-.0009 
(.0522) 
-.0001 
(.7781) 
Mon -.0006 
(.1081) 
-.001 
(.0568) 
.0003 
(.2956) 
Tue .00003 
(.9245) 
.0002 
(.579) 
.0005 
(.1566) 
Wed -.0005 
(.141) 
-.0004 
(.3968) 
.0002 
(.6251) 
Adj. R-sq .005 .004 0 
OBS 3663 3663 3663 
Notes 
 GI = General index that includes all stocks traded at KSE 
 LI = Index that includes only large firms in KSE (monthly rebalancing) 
 SI = Index that includes only small firms in KSE (monthly rebalancing) 
 Numbers in parentheses are probability values testing the hypotheses that the coefficient 
is Zero. 
 All errors are adjusted using White's covariance matrix to account for hetroscedastic 
errors. 
 
 
Table 4: Chow Structural Break Test 
 
  
GI 
 
LI 
 
SI 
P (F-statistic) .0457 .0279 .2824 
P (Log Likelihood ratio) .0452 .0276 .2811 
Notes 
 The  F-statistic is based on the comparison of the restricted and 
    unrestricted sum of squared residuals. 
 The log likelihood ratio statistic is based on the comparison  
    of the restricted and unrestricted maximum of the log likelihood function. 
 
 
The analysis shows differences between the two sub-periods with respect to the weekend effect. Before-
the-closure period shows no weekend effect as Saturday returns, although positive, are not different from zero. 
However, after the closure period, Saturday returns become significantly positive. These findings confirm the results 
obtained by the mean test in tables (2) and (3). All other days' returns are significantly negative at before-the-closure 
period except when employing the small firms' index. The opposite is true when considering the after closure period 
as all days' returns, except those of Saturdays', are not different from zero. These results are almost different from 
those obtained in studies for western stock markets which all report negative returns for the first day of the week and 
positive returns in the second trading day. The positive Saturday returns are similar to those detected by Alexakis et 
al (1995) who find positive returns for the first trading day of the week in the Greek stock market. They also 
document a negative return for the second trading day which is exactly similar to what is observed in KSE. Actually, 
the two markets might share some similar features as being relatively small emerging markets that include relatively 
small firms. It is worth to mention that the negative returns of the second trading day are also found in stock markets 
of France, Australia, Japan, Singapore, and Canada [See Condoyanni et al (1987) and Athanassakes et al (1994)].
 6
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Table 5: Diagnostic of the Week End effect 
 
Dep. Var. GI LI SI 
 Panel (A): Before KSE Closure  
Sat .0004 
(.5376) 
.0008 
(.3431) 
-.0001 
(.8188) 
Sun -.0013 
(.0128) 
-.0022 
(.0069) 
-.00007 
(.8957) 
Mon -.0013 
(.064) 
-.0021 
(.0564) 
-.00006 
(.8845) 
Tue -.0002 
(.7022) 
.0003 
(.655) 
.0006 
(.2789) 
Wed 
 
-.0004 
(.4816) 
-.0004 
(.6075) 
.0003 
(.6139) 
Adj R-Sq. .001 .004 -.002 
Obs 1615 1615 1615 
 Panel (B): After KSE Closure  
Sat .0019 
(.0001) 
.0021 
(.0001) 
.0016 
(.0104) 
Sun -.0002 
(.5915) 
.0002 
(.7576) 
-.0001 
(.7918) 
Mon -.00005 
(.8831) 
-.0002 
(.6319) 
.0007 
(.1697) 
Tue .0002 
(.6141) 
.0002 
(.7409) 
.0005 
(.3472) 
Wed -.0005 
(.1509) 
-.0003 
(.4574) 
.0001 
(.8344) 
Adj R-sq .01 .01 .001 
Obs 2048 2048 2048 
 Notes 
 GI = General index that includes all stocks traded at KSE 
 LI = Index that includes only large firms in KSE (monthly rebalancing) 
 SI = Index that includes only small firms in KSE (monthly rebalancing) 
 Numbers in parentheses are probability values testing the hypotheses that the coefficient is Zero. 
 All errors are adjusted using White's covariance matrix to account for hetroscedasticity. 
 Before KSE closure = 1st of Feb, 1984 To 1st of Aug. 1990 
 After KSE closure = 27th of Sept. 1992 To 28th of Dec. 2000 
 
 
 
Many researchers have provided some explanations for the weekend effect. Lakonishok and Maberly 
(1990) hypothesize that as information is reflected in prices with a time lag, most investors process the released 
information at weekends when they have more time and hence make their portfolio alteration decisions after the last 
trading day. Along the same lines, other researchers suggest that investors rush their investment decisions at last 
trading day which create upward pressure on prices and that pressure bids prices up, and in Monday, prices would 
come to their normal level. To test these conjectures, the relation between last (Wednesday) and first (Saturday) 
trading days is investigated in the sense that the last trading day conveys certain information that affect investors 
decisions in the following first trading day. This investigation should shed some light about an appropriate 
explanation for the observed anomalous phenomena at KSE. The relation is investigated in terms of testing the null 
hypothesis that Saturday returns are independent of Wednesday returns. This is accomplished by carrying out a 
proportion test and by constructing a contingency table using the three indices.  
 
Table (6) contains the results of the proportion test by which we investigate the hypothesis that the positive 
returns in Saturday are independent from those in Wednesday. In other words, what is tested in table (6) is whether 
or not the price increase in Saturday is independent of the price increase in Wednesday. After calculating the 
expected frequencies and the test statistic (as it shown in the table), the hypothesis of the relation between 
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Wednesday returns and Saturday returns is rejected when considering large and small indices but accepted for the 
general index. That is, when considering the general index, the probability of a positive Saturday returns seem to be 
independent from Wednesday returns; while when considering large and small indices, Saturday returns seem to be, 
on average, dependent on Wednesday returns. This means that the investment decisions of Kuwaiti investors made 
at the beginning of the week are, on average, not rebuffing to their investment decisions made before the weekend. 
Differences in results between “GI” and both “LI” and “SI” in table (6) should not be confusing since “LI” and “SI” 
indices together contain only about 22% of the listed firm in KSE  while “GI” represents the total population of the 
firms listed in KSE. Our conjecture for the results regarding “LI” and “SI” is that there is an information effect from 
the last trading day on investors sentiments over the weekend  which affects their portfolio decisions on the 
following first trading day of the week. This flow of information is not exploited by all investors but rather by only 
the professional investors who usually construct portfolios that are homogenous in certain feature (such as firm size) 
and hence we should expect those investors to rebalance their portfolios at the beginning of the week as they process 
some analysis over the weekend and hence tend to reverse those decisions on the first trading day of the week.  
 
January Effect 
 
 It has been documented in the literature that returns in January are considerably higher than returns in other 
months, especially for small stocks. This phenomenon exists in most developed stock markets as documented by 
Gultekin and Gultekin (1983).  This study also examines January seasonal in KSE. The main acceptable justification 
for the January effect (tax-selling hypothesis) doesn’t apply in KSE since the economy is tax-free.  
 
 
Table 6: Results of the Proportion Test of Independency of Returns 
 
  Panel (A) General Index  
     
  S (+ ve) S (-ve) Totals 
 W (+ ve) 184 134 318 
 W (- ve) 222 172 394 
 Totals 406 306 712 
 Test-statistic =  .17   
     
  Panel (B) Large Index  
  S (+ ve) S (-ve) Totals 
 W (+ ve) 187 145 332 
 W (- ve) 216 164 380 
 Totals 403 309 712 
 Test-statistic = 58.74   
     
  Panel (C) Small Index  
  S (+ ve) S (-ve) Totals 
 W (+ ve) 290 131 421 
 W (- ve) 175 116 291 
 Totals 465 247 712 
 Test-statistic = 111.7   
Notes 
 W (+ve) & W (-ve) = The respective positive and the negative returns in Wednesday. 
 S (+ve) & S (-ve) = The respective positive and the negative returns in Saturday. 
 General Index = Includes all firms traded in KSE 
 Large index = includes large firms in KSE (monthly rebalancing) 
 Small Index = includes small firms in KSE (monthly rebalancing) 
With 1 df [calculated as (c-1)(r-1) and "c" is the number of columns while "r" is the number of  
rows)], the tabulated value of Chi-square with 5% significance level is 3.84 
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Table (7) shows two types of tests regarding the January effect. First is investigating the average returns of 
both January and other months. Although January (other months’) returns are negative (positive), they are 
statistically insignificant. Second, the mean difference test investigates the difference between January returns and 
other months’ returns. As it appears in the table, the results of the mean difference confirm the in-existence of 
January effect in KSE as the difference between January returns and those of other months is statistically 
insignificant
7
. In contrast to what has been documented in developed stock markets which confirms the idea that 
emerging markets provide higher degree of segmentation than do developed markets, the insignificance of the 
January effect is somewhat expected in light of the study of Claessens and Dasgupta (1995) who find no evidence of 
January effect in about twenty emerging markets. 
 
 
Table 7: Monthly Mean Returns
8
 
 
 GI LI SI 
January -1.91 
(.2035) 
-1.89 
(.3795) 
-. 24 
(.4919) 
All Months . 24 
(.6595) 
. 33 
(.6329) 
1.04 
(.0624) 
Mean Difference 
 
-.0216 
(.253) 
-.0222 
(.347) 
-.0187 
(.32) 
Notes 
 All returns are in percentage form 
 GI = Index that includes all listed firms in KSE  
 LI = Index that includes large firms in KSE (monthly rebalancing) 
 SI = Index that includes small firms in KSE (monthly rebalancing) 
 Numbers in parenthesis are probability values testing the hypothesis that the coefficient is 
zero 
 
V. 3.  Summer Effect 
 
Researchers often refer to an old market wisdom that relate to the behavior of investors every year. This 
wisdom is represented by what is usually cited by the financial press in western markets as “Sell in May and go 
away”. This common saying suppose to signals a start of a bear market every year at the month of May as investors 
tend to sell their stocks for cash to spend on their vacations. This common saying appears to apply in Kuwait as 
most investors (and most people) in Kuwait spend their vacations in summer out of the country. Therefore, 
persistence in stock returns over months of the year is investigated to explore any seasonal trends.  
 
Interestingly, and opposite to our predictions, Figure (1) shows the average monthly returns over the period 1984-
2000 for the general index (GI) that includes all stocks in KSE. We can notice that stocks returns (monthly data) 
tend to be higher during the summer time which contradicts the market wisdom mentioned earlier. The same graph 
is repeated for both the small and the large portfolios during the same period (1984-2000). 
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Figure (1) Monthly Average Returns (GI)
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Figure (2) Monthly Average Returns (LI)
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Figure (3) Monthly Average Returns (SI)
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It is apparent that returns during summer time, on average, tend to be higher even after considering the 
large and the small portfolios (indices). The month of May has positive returns only when considering the small 
portfolio. Graphs usually represent informal tests. Hence, a regression model is to be formulated to investigate if 
there is a summer anomaly in KSE.  
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 The regression model takes the form of Ri = f (dummy variable) + e , where the dummy variable takes the 
value of “1” for the months from October to May and “zero” otherwise; Ri is the monthly returns of the specified 
index. Results of this test are contained in table (8). The results confirm the existence of the summer effect in KSE 
but in another (and opposite) setting than what is documented in western markets (see for example Bouman and 
Jacobsen, 1999). Specifically, summer months (May to September) in KSE tend to experience higher returns than 
those of other months of the year (October to April). This results is robust to the size of the firm as using both 
indices employed in the study don’t change the obtained result. 
 
 
Table 8: the Summer Effect 
 
 GI LI SI 
The Dummy Variable -.02941 
(.018) 
-.03593 
(.0213) 
-.03041 
(.0169) 
Adjusted R-Square .03 .0285 .033 
Notes 
 GI = General index that includes all stocks traded at KSE 
 LI = Index that includes only large firms in KSE (monthly rebalancing) 
 SI = Index that includes only small firms in KSE (monthly rebalancing) 
 Numbers in parentheses are probability values testing the hypotheses that the coefficient is Zero  
 
 
The dummy coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero (as indicated by the p-value) in all the 
three models shown in table (8). This result comes in contrast with many studies who document the opposite 
(Gultekin and Gultekin, 1983; Rozeff and Kinney, 1976). Also, this result confirm the conjecture that every market 
has its own characteristics and that emerging markets are distinct in their institutional features which should have its 
effects on the results. Furthermore, the result comes in contrast to the view of many Kuwait investors who claim that 
summer months represent a bear market since most investors take their vacations during summer.  
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
 This paper examines the sample distribution of the daily returns in order to explore the seasonal anomalies 
in KSE using a uniform data set and methodology. The evidence described so far provides (unlike what has been 
documented in developed markets) pungent support for the idea that rates of return are highest in Saturday (first 
trading day) and lowest in Sunday (second trading day) at KSE. Also, this study documents no consistent behavior 
of returns over months of the year. Although the study finds some consistent negative returns, these are insignificant 
and hence are statistically not different from zero. In addition, the study finds that, contrary to what is documented 
in developed stock markets, returns during summer months (May-September) are higher than returns in other 
months of the year (October-April). The results obtained are robust to the methodology used and to both sub-periods 
investigated and the constructed size-portfolios.  
 
 Although the nature of the obtained data compel the study to be exploratory in the sense that more detailed 
data (which are not available) has to be obtained and analyzed in order to explain the observed phenomena, there is 
some room for few explanations. One compelling argument
9
 relates to the nature of investors’ mentality in KSE. 
That is, most investors in KSE seem to double think in their investment decisions over the weekend. Unlike the 
situation in developed markets, very little news are released over the weekend at KSE and on top of that, most 
investors don’t pay attention to these news as they think that these news are not informative. As they sense nothing 
momentous has occurred at the previous week, investors tend to time their purchases at the first trading day 
following the weekend and hence their propensity to buy is higher than their propensity to sell in Saturdays
10
. At the 
same time, most investors think that their purchases have to be reversed within the next two days. Hence, those 
investors, and in order to capitalize on their marginal profits, rush to sell what has been bought in Saturday to. 
Another rational explanation is the risk factor. That is, influential investors in KSE usually, by a bit collusion, bid 
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stock prices up in Saturday, speculating that they find buyers to these stocks on Sunday in which they dump the 
market with stocks. Apparently, this strategy entails higher risk exposure.  
 
 Regarding the difference in results between KSE and other international stock markets, one has to notice 
three main institutional differences. First is the relatively smaller size of firms traded in KSE and these firms are 
thinly traded (Al-loughani, 1995). Second is that all firms as well as investors in KSE don’t pay taxes. Third, KSE 
market as an emerging market is still developing institutionally. Accordingly, investors’ sentiment and risk aversion 
are altered due to these developments  
 
For January effect, Kuwait has free-tax economy and hence tax-selling experienced in other stock markets 
(which sought to cause January effect) is absent in Kuwait and therefore, one should not expect turn-of-the-year 
seasonal. On the other hand, it seems that many influential investors manage their investments in summer in a 
certain way that causes returns of summer months (May-September) to be higher than those of other months of the 
year
11
. One implication has to be mentioned and we quit. Usually, when certain regularities exist in an equity 
market, one would wonder if these regularities can be impeded in an investment strategy. That is, how investors in 
KSE would behave to deal with such phenomena. The concept of stock market efficiency is contingent upon 
information availability to all investors, which hinders any exploitation by part of the investment community. 
Kuwaiti investors don’t seem to behave according to the news released over the weekend about firms. Although the 
commission costs should be considered before full exploitation of the anomaly, the conventional wisdom dictates 
that investors should delay their stocks’ sale from Wednesday, for example, to Saturday, and repurchase or make 
their purchase decisions on Sunday. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 It is worth noting here that tax-loss selling is irrelevant in KSE since one of the distinct feature of Kuwaiti 
economy is that it is a tax-free economy. 
2
 KSE annual report, different issues. 
3
 An interesting article on the importance of noise in security returns would be that of Fisher Black's (1986) 
presidential address. 
4
 Recently, a rule has been issued that halts trading of securities whose firms delay their annual (or quarterly) 
financial statements more than 3 months. 
5
 Kuwait was occupied by Iraq on 2
nd
 of Aug, 1990 but was liberated at 26
th
 of Feb, 1991. Definitely, resuming 
trading just right after liberation was not a priority and KSE reopening came after rebuilding the country. 
6
 Some researchers, for example Alexakis et al (1995), have employed a GARCH model to account for the changing 
variance over time. The same analysis in tables (2, 3, and 4) was carried out but using GARCH model. Since almost 
the same results were obtained as in tables (2, 3, and 4) regarding the positive returns on Saturday and the negative 
returns on Sunday, the results are not reported for brevity reasons. 
7 A regression test also is run to investigate the relation between returns and January returns but the results are not 
different from those obtained in table (7) hence the results are not reported for brevity reasons. 
8 The monthly returns are calculated based on the closing price of the month. 
9
 This explanation was brought up by many investors who were asked by the researcher. 
10
 Due to data unavailability, we can not claim that there is a day of the week effect in processing information. 
11 Many information are needed to investigate this conjecture but unfortunately are unavailable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
